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In contrast to its previously pro-plaintiff attitude in construing antitrust
legislation, 132 the Supreme Court has, in recent years, evinced a more moderate
stance. 133 While removing the inequities inherent in the recovery of automatic
damages, the instant Court's requirement of actual injury moves toward a
34
stricter view of causation in determining Robinson-Patman Act injuries.
35
often
The instant case thus serves to limit the scope of the antitrust laws,
placing an insurmountable obstacle before antitrust plaintiffs and hampering
private antitrust enforcement. 3 6
MAuREEN LEFEBVRE

PASSPORT REVOCATION: BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
Haigv. Agee, 101 S.Ct. 2766 (1981)
Respondent, a former agent for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had
been residing in West Germany.' In 1974, respondent publicly announced his
intention to interfere with and expose CIA operations abroad. 2 Respondent
See Seplaki, supra note 90, at 186. There is also authority that private enforcement and
treble damages serve a useful function. Some commentators consider large treble damages
judgments greater deterrents to wrong-doers than any government action. See, e.g., Seplaki,
supra note 90, at 186; Barber, supra note 55, at 183-84. As well, section 4 of the Clayton Act
has been interpreted as a congressional policy mandating private enforcement of the antitrust
laws. See note 13 supra. If proof of injury impedes effective private enforcement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, as many commentators believe, then requiring proof of actual injury
will serve to hamper the enforcement of the Act through private damage suits. See generally,
Barber, supra note 55; Seplaki, supra note 90. On the subject of damages and proof of injury, see Blair, supra note 126; Page, supra note 74; Seplaki, supra note 90; Weinberg, supra
note 16.
132. See Page, supra note 74, at 467-68; Posner, supra note 115, at 819-21.
133. See note 132 supra.
134. See generally Rez, supra note 56; Weinberg, supra note 25.
135. Brunswick was seen as an effective step by the Court in overhauling antitrust doctrine.
One commentator stated, "if the Court adheres to its [Brunswick] holding ...

the case will

have far-reaching consequences . . .the courts inevitably will become aware that large portions of present antitrust doctrine prohibit conduct which is not anticompetitive at all."
Baxter, Placing the Burger Court in HistoricalPerspective, 47 ANTrrxusr L.J. 803, 816 (1979).
The Court in the instant case adhered to its Brunswick decision. It could well have farreaching consequences on the antitrust plaintiff's ability to prove injury. Compare notes 127131 suprawith Cox, supranote 78.
136. See notes 126-131 supra.
1. 101 S.Ct. 2766, 2769-70 (1981). Phillip Agee, an American citizen, was a CIA employee
from 1957 to 1968. During that time he held key positions in the CIA and was responsible for
gathering covert intelligence in foreign countries. Id.
2. Id. The press release from London stated: "Today, I announced a new campaign to
fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating. This campaign will have two main
functions: First, to expose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive
them out of the countries where they are operating; secondly, to seek within the United States
to have the CIA abolished.
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a
subsequently engaged in various other activities intended to disrupt the GIA.
4
In 1979, respondent's passport was revoked pursuant to a federal regulation
granting the Department of State authority to refuse passports where national
security was at stake.5 Consequently, respondent brought suit in federal district
court alleging the passport revocation violated his constitutional rights and
that the regulation had not been authorized by Congress., Without reaching
the constitutional issues, 7 the district court granted summary judgment for the

"This effort to identify CIA people in foreign countries has been going on for some time ....
[Today's] list was complied by a small group of Mexican comrades whom I trained to follow
the comings and goings of CIA people before I left Mexico City.
"Similar lists of CIA people in other countries are already being compiled and will be
announced when appropriate. We invite participation in this campaign from all those who
strive for social justice and national dignity." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 107a,
Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981). See also P. AcEE, INSIDE THE CONIPANY: CIA DIARY (1975);
P. AGEE & L. WOLF, DIRTY WORKS: THE CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (1978). There was some
evidence that these publications which identified hundreds of CIA personnel had been followed
by acts of violence directed against the individuals named by respondent. However, the government made no assertion that respondent had directly caused these violent acts nor that
the published material directly incited anyone to violence. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
lla, 116a-118a, App., Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981).
3. Respondent allegedly went to several target countries and recruited collaborators who
were trained to expose CIA operations. See note 2 supra. On December 17, 1979 the NEW
YORK POST reported respondent had contact with the militants who were holding fifty American hostages in Iran. The article reported that respondent had agreed to interpret CIA documents which had been found in the captured embassy in exchange for release of the hostages.
Respondent's affidavit stated that he had no contact with Iran and had no intention of
travelling there, at least until the hostages would be released. The majority cited to a government affidavit which mentioned an earlier report that the respondent had been invited to
Iran in order to participate in a "Revolutionary Tribunal." 101 S. Ct. at 2771 n.8. However,
the report referred to was the above New York Post article, and the government declined to
vouch for its veracity. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 116a-117a, Haig v. Agee, 101
S. Ct. 2766 (1981). See also Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
4. 101 S.Ct. at 2771. The notice stated in part: "The Department's action is predicated
upon a determination made by the Secretary under the provisions of [22 C.F.R.] Section
51.70(b)(4) that your activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the
national security or the foreign policy of the United States. The reasons for the Secretary's
determination are, in summary, as follows: Since the early 1970's it has been your stated intention to conduct a continuous campaign to disrupt the intelligence operations of the United
States. In carrying out that campaign you have traveled in various countries (including,
among others, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba, and Germany), and
your activities in those countries have caused serious damage to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States. Your stated intention to continue such activities threatens
additional damage of the same kind." Id.
5. 22 C.F.R. §51.70(b)(4) (1979) provides: "A passport may be refused in any case in
which: The Secretary determines that the national's activities are causing or are likely to
cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States."
Respondent conceded that any reason sufficient to deny an applicant a passport would also be
sufficient to revoke a passport. 101 S. Ct. at 2773-74. See 22 C.F.R. §51.71(a) (1980). Recently
respondent was granted a passport from Grenada. Newsweek, August 10, 1981, at 15.
6. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.C. 1980).
7. Id. at 730. Respondent's complaint challenged the revocation of his passport on five
grounds: (1) that 22 C.F.R. §51.70(b)(4) had not been authorized by Congress and was therefore invalid; (2) that 22 C.F.R. §51.70(b)(4) is impermissibly vague and overbroad; (3) that
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respondent." The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.9 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, and HELD,
that the passport revocation did not violate respondent's constitutional rights.10
Although passports were generally unnecessary prior to World War I 1"
they are now required for travel abroad.' 2 The Passport Act of 1926 vested
control over the issuance of passports in the Secretary of State.' 3 Consequently,
the executive branch acquired discretionary authority to limit individual travel.
The Secretary of State often purported to use this power to protect national
security.' 4 Until the 1950's, however, there were virtually no discernable
standards for justifying passport denials. 5
In early incidents of passport refusals, denied applicants were merely informed that their travel abroad would be contrary to the best interests of the
United States.' 6 In Kent v. Dulles,- however, the Supreme Court placed rethe revocation of his passport prior to a hearing violated his fifth amendment right to procedural due process; (4) that the revocation of his passport violated his right to travel -a
liberty interest protected by the fifth amendment; and (5) that his passport was revoked in
order to punish him and suppress his criticism of government policy in violation of the first
amendment. 629 F.2d at 82.
8. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D.D.C. 1980). The district court found that the
challenged regulation was invalid because it had not been either explicitly or impliedly
authorized by Congress. Id.
9. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980). A divided panel found that congressional legislation did not expressly authorize the Secretary to deny or revoke a passport for
national security or foreign policy grounds, nor had Congress by its inaction impliedly assented to such executive action. Id. at 85, 87. Accordingly, the constitutional attacks on the
regulation were not considered. Id. at 87 n.9. See generally 22 HARv. INTL' L.J. 187 (1981);
56 NOTRE DAE LAw. 508 (1981).
10. 101 S. Ct. at 2783.
11. The passport, although not necessary for ingress and egress, was perceived as serving
three purposes: (1) it was evidence of the bearer's United States citizenship; (2) it contained
a request to the host country to aid and protect the bearer; and (3) it was believed that the
United States government would take greater interest in the protection of a citizen bearing a
passport. Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. REv. 129, 129 (1966). For a general history of United
States passport policies, see 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 435-52 (1942);
Gould, The Right to Travel and National Security, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 334, 334-39.

12. See 8 U.S.C. §1185(b) (Supp. In 1979) which makes it unlawful for a citizen to enter
or leave the United States without a valid passport.
13. 22 U.S.C. §211a (1976). The Act begins: "The Secretary of State may grant and
issue passports ... " Id. The use of the word "may" has been construed as conferring discretionary authority to grant passports upon the Secretary, rather than for the Secretary to be
merely an issuing agent for efficiency reasons. Comment, Passport Refusals for Political
Reasons: ConstitutionalIssues and JudicialReview, 61 YALE L.J. 171, 172-73 (1952).
14. See note 19 infra. For a discussion of executive restrictions on entry of alien subversives into the United States, see, Developments in the Law - The National Security Interest

and Civil Liberties, 85 HAav. L. REv. 1130, 1153-60 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
15.

Ehrlich, supra note 13, at 131. See also Comment, supra note 13, at 173-74.

16. In 1947, Dr. Martin Kamen applied for a passport to accept an invitation to lecture
at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel. His application was denied because he had
been previously investigated by the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities even though

that Committee had found no connection between him and any subversive organizations. In
1948, Leo Isaacson, a United States Congressman, was denied a passport to attend an international conference in Paris. The purpose of his trip was to gain first-hand information about
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straints upon the use of such broad executive discretion. In Kent, two applicants were denied passports under a federal regulation prohibiting the
issuance of passports to Communists."' The applicants were informed that submission of affidavits disproving their Communist Party memberships was a
prerequisite to their obtaining passports.' 9 The Court invalidated the regulation without analyzing the constitutional issues raised by the passport denial.20
In dictum, however, the Court noted that the right to international travel is an
essential component of the liberty interest protected by the fifth amendment.2 1
Furthermore, the Court refused to infer that Congress had given the Secretary
of State unbridled discretion to deny passports when a constitutionally protected right was at issue. 22 Rather, the Kent court suggested it would closely

examine any governmental denial of the freedom to travel that was based on an
23
individual's exercise of first amendment rights.

activities in Greece so that he could reinforce his opposition to a bill giving aid to the Greek
government. In 1950, Paul Robeson had his passport revoked prior to his scheduled speaking
and concert tours in Europe. In each of these instances, the only official explanation given
was that his "travel abroad at this time would be contrary to the best interests of the United
States." Comment, supra note 13, at 173-77. These cases are indicative of the State Department's willingness to consider an applicant's political view, activities and associations when
denying a passport on the grounds of the national security. Id. at 178.
17. 357 U.s. 116 (1958).
18. Id. at 117-18 & n.l. The federal regulations essentially forbade a passport to anyone
who had had any contact with the Communist movement. 22 C.F.R. §51.135 (1957).
19. 357 U.S. at 118-20. Any applicant who stated he was a Communist was automatically
foreclosed from receiving a passport, with no right to an administrative appeal. 22 C.F.R.
§51.142 (1958). During the same term as Kent, the Court specifically identified the interest in
non-disclosure as a part of the freedom of association, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson,
357 U.S. 499 (1958).
20. 357 U.S. at 129. Section 51.135 was invalidated because the Court found that the
Secretary had not been delegated the authority to withhold a passport based on the applicant's beliefs and associations. The Court concluded that only two categories of denials
had been authorized by Congress: (1) criminal or unlawful conduct, and (2) non-allegiance.
Id. at 127. See also 22 U.S.C. §212 (1976).
21. 357 U.S. at 125. Finding that the freedom of travel was part of the fifth amendment
was unnecessary to the Court's decision and therefore lacked the force of a holding. This
observation has been used so pervasively by the Supreme Court, however, that there is no
doubt international travel is constitutionally protected. Comment, Executive Restriction on
Travel: The Passport Cases, 5 Hous. L. REV. 499, 507 (1968). See also United States v. Laub,
385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 505-06, 516 (1964). It is noteworthy that the majority in Kent did not distinguish between interstate and international travel. Later, however, the two were distinguished, the former being characlerized as a fundamental right, with the latter being considered only a constitutional "freedom." Therefore, each evoked a different level of constitutional review. See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 6 (1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 399 U.S.
THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTrrUrIoN (1956).
618, 622 (1969). See generally L. CHASIAFE,
22. 357 U.S. at 129.
23. Id. at 130. Although freedom of association is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized that this freedom is implicit in the first amendment. The Court has construed this concept as embracing the right to join with others in
exercising, as a group, those liberties which are protected by the first amendment if exercised separately. The associational rights of groups formed for political advocacy, such as
the Communist Party, have been consistently afforded stringent protection. See, e.g., Cousins
v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 478-79 (1975).
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The Court subsequently employed the Kent analysis in Aptheker v. Secretary of State.24 In Aptheker, plaintiffs, high ranking officials of the Communist
Party,2 5 argued that a federal act 28 which made it unlawful for any member of
a Communist organization to apply for or use a passport was unconstitutionally
overbroad. The Court, however, stated that while the purpose of the statute was

legitimate, the means employed to achieve that purpose infringed upon plaintiff's right of association. 27 Because less drastic methods of effecting the purpose
of the statute were available and because obviously relevant considerations in
determining whether a passport should be issued were excluded by the statute,
the Court declared it overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.28 Moreover,
the Court rejected the government's argument that even if the statute was unconstitutional on its face, it was constitutional as applied because the national

security interest clearly outweighed the plaintiff's liberty interests.29 Recognizing that the freedom of travel was akin to the rights of free speech and association, the Court refused to require individuals to assume the burden of disproving a facially unconstitutional statute2 0 To do so, according to the court,

24. 378 U.S. B00 (1964).
25. Id. at 515. Plaintiff Aptheker was editor of PoliticalAffairs, known as the "theoretical
organ" of the Party. Plaintiff Flynn was chairman of the Party. Id.
26. Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §785 (1976),
provides in pertinent part: "(a) When a Communist organization... is registered, or there is
in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice that such organization is
so registered or that such order has become final -(1) to make application for a passport, or
the renewal of a passport, to be issued or renewed by or under the authority of the United
States; or (2) to use or attempt to use any such passport."
27. 378 U.S. at 514. There was no distinction made between a member of the Communist
Party who only espoused its ideas and philosophies, and one who had the intention of instigating an unlawful overthrow of the government. Id. at 509-10. Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (invalidating a mandatory non-Communist oath for public employment). The section was also invalidated because it set up "an irrebutable presumption
that individuals who are members of the specified organizations will, if given passports, engage in activities inimical to the security of the United States." 378 U.S. at 511. Such stigmatizations of classes of persons have been consistently struck down by the Supreme Court because
they impose a burden without due process. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 454 n.29
(1965); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544-45
(1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring in result).
28. 378 U.S. at 515.
29. Id. The government asked that the traditional rules of standing be applied, and that
plaintiffs not be allowed to assert the rights of third parties not presently before the Court.
For policies supporting this "as applied" method of analysis, see Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 847-52 (1970).
30. 378 U.S. at 517. The majority's statement that "freedom of travel is a constitutional
liberty closely related to rights of free speech and association" led some commentators to believe the Court was placing international travel on par with other fundamental rights. See,
e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912 (9th Cir. 1973); Comment, Judicial Review of
the Right to Travel: A Proposal,42 WAsH. L. REV. 873, 878-81 (1967). However, in light of
later passport cases, the more widely accepted interpretation of the above quote is that international travel receives the preferred treatment when a fundamental right has been implicated
by the government's travel restriction. See Note, The Right to Travel Abroad, 42 FoRDHAM L,
Rav. 838, 843 (1974).
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would potentially chill the exercise of constitutional freedoms by individuals
within the purview of the statute.3 '
The Supreme Court permitted governmental restrictions on international
travel in Zemel v. Rusk. 2 The appellant in Zemel sought to have his passport
validated in order to travel to Cuba to gather information about that country.
Because of national security concerns,3 however, the Secretary of State had
imposed an area restriction on travel to Cuba .3 4 In upholding the Secretary's
refusal to validate the passport, the Court determined the area restriction did
not violate appellant's constitutional rights.35 The Kent and Aptheker decisions were distinguished on two major grounds. First, Zemel involved an area
restriction directly resulting from foreign policy considerations which affected
all citizens. In contrast, the two earlier cases involved restrictions based upon
the individual activities of the applicants.36 Second, the passport refusal in
31. 378 U.S. at 515-17. This potential chilling effect is the primary policy supporting the
use of the overbreadth doctrine rather than the "as applied" method. See note 27 supra. Even
if the plaintiffs in Aptheker posed an actual threat to national security, the wording of the
statute prescribed punishment for a substantial number of persons validly exercising their
fundamental rights. By upholding the statute, not only would the fear of punishment inhibit the free exercise of first amendment freedoms, but the burden would be on one so
punished to bring suit to have the law invalidated. See Note, supra note 29, at 852-55. Cf.
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (denial of employment to Communist in defense
facilities); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating a city ordinance which required a permit for street worship meetings). But cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding a court martial based on a code proscribing ungentlemanly conduct); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding a statute forbidding civil service employees from
engaging in active politicking).
32. 381 U.S. I, rehearingdenied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
33. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, preceded the filing of the applicant's
complaint by less than two months. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 84 n.3.
34. 381 U.S. at 3. After breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba, the State Department
declared all outstanding passports invalid for travel to Cuba unless specially endorsed. Endorsements were available to newsmen, businessmen with previously established business
interests, or other persons whose travel the government deemed to be in the best interests of
the United States. Id. The area restriction was imposed in Department of State Public Notice
179, 26 Fed. Reg. 492 (1961): "In view of the conditions existing in Cuba and in the absence
of diplomatic relations between that country and the United States of America I find that the
unrestricted travel by United States citizens to or in Cuba would be contrary to the foreign
policy of the United States and would be otherwise inimical to the national interest."
35. 381 U.S. at 13-17. Before reaching the constitutional issues, the Court first needed
congressional authorization for the Secretary's power to impose area restrictions. As in Kent,
the Court discovered no explicit authorization. See note 21 supra. However, the Court did find
an administrative practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the conclusion that
Congress had implicitly approved of executive-designated area restrictions. 381 U.S. at 8.
36. 381 U.S. at 13. The Court's primary purpose in making this distinction was to validate
the Secretary of State's authority. See note 35 supra. The Court in Kent had found only two
types of authorized passport restrictions based on a history of past administrative action. 357
U.S. at 127. See note 20 supra. Because the restriction in Zemel related to neither of these, the
Court developed a separate history of area restrictions, consistent enough to find a proper
delegation of authority. But see Ehrlich, supra note 11, at 143, where it is suggested that the
Court's reliance on the history of area restrictions might have been misplaced. This distinction,
however, is also a necessary step in the Court's finding that no fundamental rights were involved. See note 37 infra.
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Zemel was not predicated upon any expression or association protected as a
fundamental right.3 7Although the Court acknowledged the constitutional basis
of both the fifth amendment liberty to travel3 s and the right to gather information,39 those interests were not accorded the same constitutional status as the
first amendment guarantees. 40
In a subsequent non-passport case,41 members of the Court expressed
divergent views concerning the proper balance between the right to free speech
and the preservation of national security. Two Justices determined that the
first amendment right was absolute and that no governmental interest could be
sufficient to justify a prior restraint of speech.42 The other Justices envisaged
37. 381 U.S. at 16. The Court distinguished plaintiffs' claim from those raised in Kent
and Aptheker; the plaintiff in Zemel was not forced to choose between a fundamental right
and the freedom to travel.
38. Id. at 14. The Court quoted from Kent, giving further import to the statement that
the right to travel is a liberty protected by the fifth amendment. Id. See note 21 supra.
39. 381 U.S. at 16. Plaintiff had alleged that the travel ban directly interfered with "the
First Amendment rights of citizens to travel abroad so that they might acquaint themselves
at first hand with the effects abroad of our Government's policies, foreign and domestic, and
with conditions abroad which might affect such policies." Id. The Court admitted that the
area restriction did inhibit this flow of information, but that it did not involve a first amendment xight. Id. See note 42 infra.

40. 381 U.S. at 14-16. The Court took this opportunity to dispel any doubts about the
status of the freedom of international travel. After the Court in Aptheker had used a first
amendment analysis of the right to travel, supra note 80, the Zemel Court emphasized that
this freedom was protected only by due process. Thus, the Court laid to rest any notions that
international travel is a fundamental right when it approved the Secretary's determination
that travel to Cuba might involve the nation in dangerous international incidents. The Court
held the Secretary's determination sufficient to constitutionally justify an abridgment of travel.
381 U.S. at 14-16. See Note, supra note 30, at 843.
Dismissing the right to gather information as a first amendment right, the Court explained
that any xestriction of information gathering is an inhibition of action rather than speech.
The Court justified this position by stating that there are few restrictions of action in which
it could not be argued that the flow of information was being decreased. 381 U.S. at 16. This
explanation has been highly criticized as insufficient to warrant a denial of fundamental right
status. See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLum. L. Rav. 838, 846
(1971); Note, Travel and the First Amendment: Zemel v. Rusk, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 470, 473
(1966).
41. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The government wished to
suppress publication of the Pentagon Papers, a classified study on United States policy making
in Vietnam. Id. at 714. The government claimed publication of the documents would prolong
the Vietnam war by providing the enemy with helpful information and would embarrass the
United States in the conduct of its diplomacy. The per curiam decision held only that the
government's interest was insufficient to overcome the heavy burden of a prior restraint on
political speech. The decision, although short and unrevealing, appeared to reaffirm the Court's
previous statement of aversion to prior restraint. Becker, The Supreme Court's Recent
"National Security" Decisions: Which Interests Are Being Protected?, 40 TENN. L. REv. 1, 17
(1972).
42. 403 U.S. at 715, 719. Justices Black and Douglas expressed that the right was absolute.
Justice Black stated: "In my view it is unfortunate that some of my Brethren are apparently
willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would
make a shambles of the First Amendment." Id. at 715. These opinions follow the absolutist
interpretations of the first amendment, typical of Justices Black and Douglas. See Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
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circumstances where such prior restraints would be constitutionally permissible. 43 Nevertheless, those Justices would have required the government to show
that the exercise of first amendment freedoms would have a "direct, immediate
44
and irreparable effect" on the national security.
The instant case presented the Court with another opportunity to balance
national security interests against the freedoms of speech and travel. The Court
initially determined that the [ederal regulation which permitted the Secretary
of State to refuse passports was impliedly authorized by Congress.' 5 In addressing respondent's constitutional arguments, the Court rejected the respondent's claim that his freedom to travel had been impermissibly burdened.4 6
376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 339
(1957) (Black, J., concurring); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
43. Justice Brennan's viewpoint fell somewhere between Justices Black and Douglas' absolutist views, and the opinions of the other concurring Justices. Although his view was almost
absolute in effect, he found a prior restraint could be effected if the government could prove
that the publication would "inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea.
403 U.S. at 726-27.
(Brennan, J., concurring).
Justices Stewart and White found the government's interest more substantial than had
Brennan and recognized instances where a prior restraint could be justified by national defense and foreign affairs demands. However, neither justice found that the government in
that instance had met the very heavy burden needed to allow a prior restraint. Id. at 727-30
(Stewart, J., concurring, with whom White, J., joined). Justice Stewart articulated this burden
by stating that the disclosure can be restrained if it will "surely result in direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." Id. at 730. (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall based his concurrence on the absence of Congressional authorization for
prior restraint in that situation. Id. at 747. (Marshall, J., concurring). He did recognize that
the prohibition was not absolute, but did not prescribe a test for when a prior restraint would
be allowed. Id. at 742. (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Becker, supra note 41, at 17-18;
Developments, supra note 14, at 1329-40.
44. 403 U.S. at 730. This is the test articulated by Justice Stewart. Here it is considered
the test of the concurring justices because it is the least burdensome of those given.
45. 101 S. Ct. at 2781. Indeed, most of the Court's opinion was concerned with whether
the Secretary of State had the authority to invoke 22 C.F.R. §51.70(b)(4) (1980). The Secretary
claimed authorization under 22 U.S.C. §211a. See note 13 supra. Because there was no explicit delegation under that statute, the Court sought to find implied authorization by using
the historical analysis test as developed in Kent and Zemel. The test consists of finding a prior
administrative practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the implied approval
of Congress. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.D.C. 1980). The major disagreement between the majority and the dissent was over the application of the word "practice" in the
above test. 101 S. Ct. at 2785 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority admitted that there was
not a sufficient administrative practice, but attributed this to the lack of situations which involved a passport holder causing serious damage to national security. Id. at 2786. Nevertheless,
the majority claimed that the validity of the power was not lost through its non-use; the
policy of protecting national security through passport control had been sufficiently established
to find that congressional silence was implied authorization. Id.
The dissent argued that not only did the word "practice" mean practice, but that Kent
specifically stated that mere policy construction by the Executive was insufficient. Id. at 2786
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, although joining the majority's opinion, stated in
a concurring opinion that the dissent's interpretation was correct and that the majority was
sub silentis overruling the test as outlined in Zemel and Kent. Id. at 2783-84 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
46. 101 S. Ct. at 2781. The Court phrased the respondent's constitutional attacks as:
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The Court distinguished the freedom to travel outside the United States from
the fundamental right to travel within the United States.47 The freedom to
travel abroad is a "liberty" protected by the due process clause. Therefore, it is
subject to reasonable governmental regulation. 48 Accordingly, the Court determined that the passport revocation in the instant case was a reasonable
means to nullify the respondent's threat to national security. 9
In dismissing respondent's first amendment claim, 50 the Court acknowledged that he had been engaged in political criticism and that the revocation
of his passport was partially based on the content of this criticism.51 However,
because respondent's disclosures of agents' names and locations were made with
the stated purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruitment
of intelligence personnel, they were "clearly not protected by the Constitution." 52 Additionally, any incidental restrictions on respondent's freedoms were
justified as inhibitions of action rather than of speech.53 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that even though respondent's passport was revoked, he still
retained his constitutional right to criticize the government.54 Finally, the Court
dismissed respondent's contention that the revocation of his passport was a
punishment for his attack on governmental practices and policies.5 5 The Court
asserted that the federal regulation authorized passport denials only where
there was a likelihood of serious damage to national security and, therefore,
adequate standards for the protection of respondent's constitutional rights
were provided. 56
"first, that the revocation of his passport impermissably burdens his freedom to travel; second,
that the action was intended to penalize his exercise of free speech and deter his criticism of
government policies and practices; and third, that the failure to accord him a prerevocation
hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process." Id.
47. Id. (citing Califano v. Aznavorian, 489 U.S. 170, 176 (1978)).
48. The Court admitted that passport revocation curtailed travel, but because it was a
freedom protected only by due process, "it is subject to 'reasonable' governmental regulation."
101 S. Ct. at 2781-82. See generally, Note, 19 Va. J. Int'l. L. 707 (1979).
49. 101 S. Ct. at 2782.
50. The Court first assumed, arguendo, that first amendment protections reached outside
the United States. Id. -t 2783.
51.

Id.

52. Id. The Court denied respondent's activity constitutional protection even though he
was engaged in political criticism. Although this is normally a highly protected constitutional
activity, the Court found that the disclosures fit within the exception derived from Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). That case stated, "No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service on the publication of the
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops." Id. at 716, citing CHAFEE,
FkmDOm OF SPEECH 10 (1920). The Court then favorably compared respondents disclosures

of agents and its declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations. 101 S. Ct. at 2788.
53. 100 S.Ct. at 2783 (citing Zemel, 881 U.S. at 16-17).
54. Id. The Court also mentioned the additional restrictions of respondent's contractual
limitation. Respondent, as a condition of his employment, had signed a secrecy agreement
which obliged him never to reveal any classified information or any secret information concerning the CIA without the express consent of the Director of Central Intelligence. Id. The
validity of such agreements was upheld in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
55. Id. at 2783, n.61.
56.

Id.
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The two dissenting Justices stated that consideration of the constitutional
issues was unnecessary because the regulation authorizing passport refusal was
invalidly adopted. 57 Nevertheless, the dissent rejected the majority's treatment
of the respondent's constitutional claims as oversimplifications or as errors of
law and fact.58 The dissent stated that although respondent's speech was undoubtedly protected, respondent's first amendment rights might be outweighed
by national security interests. Therefore, the dissent reasoned that the Court
must balance these interests to determine whether the interest in national
security should prevail over first amendment rights. 59 The dissent was also concerned that the instant decision could lead to future passport invalidations
based solely on the traveler's expressed foreign policy views.6° Consequently,
the dissenting Justices implied that the majority should have permitted respondent, on behalf of other travelers, to argue that the regulation was void
as overbroad. 61 Finally, the dissent feared that through the receipt of such
broad discretionary powers the executive branch had acquired a quasi-lawmaking function. 62
The guarantee of free speech has been foremost among those freedoms
vigorously defended by the Court.63 Nevertheless, the instant Court displayed
57. Id. at 2788 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the majority had
failed to properly apply the threshold test announced in Kent and Zemel. That is, there is a
presumption that Congress must expressly delegate authority to deny passports for national
security reasons. To overcome this presumption, the government must show "an administrative
practice sufficiently substantial and consistent" as to suggest that Congress had condoned such
authority. Id. at 2788-89.
58. Id. at 2789 n.10. The dissent stressed that respondent's concessions at trial were solely
for the purpose of challenging the facial validity of the regulation. Id. The dissent suggested
that until the facts were settled, the court could not properly determine whether respondent's
conduct justified passport refusal.
59. Id. at 2788.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2783 n.61 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-56 (1974)). The majority
credited the district court as holding that respondent had no standing to argue the overbreadth issue because respondent fell clearly within the core of the regulation.
62. Id. at 2788 n.9. The dissent was particularly concerned by statements made during
the oral arguments: "QUESTION: General McCree, supposing a person right now were to
apply for a passport to go to Salvador, and when asked the purpose of his journey, to say, to
denounce the United States policy in Salvador in supporting the junta. And the Secretary of
State says, I just will not issue a passport for that purpose. Do you think that he can consistently do that in the light of our previous cases? SOLICITOR GENERAL MCCREE: I
would say, yes, he can. Because we have to vest these-The President of the United States
and the Secretary of State working under him are charged with conducting the foreign policy
of the Nation, and the freedom of speech that we enjoy domestically may be different from
that that we can exercise in this context." Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Haig v. Agee,
101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981).
63. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (under the Constitution, free speech is not a right to be given only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
(freedom of speech is the indispensible condition of nearly every other form of freedom);
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (the constitutional right to free
discussion must be jealously guarded). See generally Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation
to Self Government, reprinted in MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
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untenable deference to the executive branch's determination that national

security interests outweighed respondent's fundamental rights. Moreover, because the majority refused to recognize that respondent's right to free speech

had been infringed upon,64 no balancing of interests was actually performed.
By refusing to require the government to show that the damage to national
security outweighed the exercise of a fundamental right, the Court has set a
precedent which could lead to a similar result in cases where the balance
dearly favored the individual.
If the instant case had not involved a violation of fundamental rights, the
Court would have been correct in using the reasonableness standard in reviewing abridgements of the freedom to travel.6 5 Respondent's passport was invalidated, however, because of his speech. 66 Rather than concentrating on the
validity of passport revocation itself, the proper focus should have centered on
the reasons for the revocation and the intended effect of the travel restriction.This approach was used in Aptheker, where the denial of appellant's passport
because of his Communist associations prompted the Court to apply the strict
level of review appropriate for first amendment violations.68 Similarly, because
the passport revocation in the instant case resulted from the content of past
speech and was intended to deter future expression, the Court should have required a compelling reason for the government's action. Moreover, under this

approach, even if respondent's right to free speech was outweighed by national
security interests, the federal regulation authorizing such revocation might be
invalid on overbreadth grounds.6 9
Generally, the Court will not allow a complainant to challenge laws on the
grounds that they may be unconstitutional as applied to others7o Nonetheless,
64. 101 S. Ct. at 2783. After describing respondent's actions, the court stated that "they
are clearly not protected by the Constitution." Id. The dissent noted the fallacy of even this
brief statement by the majority. Respondent's activities, because they were political speech,
are protected by the Constitution. However, after a careful balance, it might be found that
they are outweighed by the governmental interest. Id. at 2788 n.10.
65. See, e.g., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978) (validity of a statute depriving
Social Security benefits when abroad was to be judged by whether provisions could be found
to be rationally based); MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964), afi'd, 344 F.2d
963 (3d Cir. 1965) (the constitutional right to travel abroad is not unlimited in time, space,
or circumstances, but is subject to appropriate and reasonable regulation); Worthy v. United
States, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964) (Congress having the power to declare policy with respect to foreign affairs, likewise has the authority to impose reasonable restrictions on travel
in foreign countries).
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2783.
67. The Supreme Court has not been hesitant to examine the motives underlying executive or administrative decisions. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
68. 378 U.S. at 517. See note 29 supra. Also see Comment, Executive Restriction on
Travel: The Passport Cases, 5 Hous. L. Rev. 499, 507-08 (1968).
69. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
70. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REy. 844, 844
(1970). This is also known as the "as applied" method of review because the constitutionality
of an overbroad statute is judged only in light of its application to the case at bar. Id. See
generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE
LJ. 599, 599-626 (1962); Note, Who May Test the Constitutionality of a Statute in the
Supreme Court, 47 HAv. L. Rav. 677 (1934).
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in the area of first amendment rights, the overbreadth doctrine has long provided an exception. 71 Typically, the overbreadth doctrine invalidates legislation
designed to regulate unprotected activities but which inadvertently burdens
first amendment rights. If the law has a "real and substantial" chilling effect on
legitimate speech,7 2 and it cannot be narrowly construed by the courts, it may
be declared invalid on its face. 73 The Aptheker decision suggested that the
threat of passport revocation has an adverse effect on the freedom to express
one's convictions.74 Similarly, the dissent in the instant case asserted that passport revocations may have a substantial chilling effect on other citizens who
express views on foreign policy.75 Given the apparent chilling effect on the
first amendment rights of all international travelers, the respondent might have
been able to successfully argue that the regulation was overbroad. The Court,
however, has been reluctant to use overbreadth analysis, 76 because such analysis
might weaken the executive branch's traditionally powerful role in foreign
affairs .

7

71. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), where Justice Brennan explained: "IThe
instant decree may be invalid if it prohibits privileged exercises of First Amendment rights
whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct. For
in appraising a statute's inhibitory effect upon such rights, this court has not hesitated to take
into account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that at bar."
Id. at 432. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (19,10). For a
complete discussion of all the issues and policies concerning overbreadth analysis, see generally,
Note, supra note 75.
72. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). This standard was also restated
as "when the flaw is a substantial concern in the context of the statute as a whole." Id. at 616
n.14. In the present discussion, "real" means the effect is not imaginary, that is, that where
the impact of the law is felt, the burden on protected activity is significant. "Substantiality"
is deemed present when a sufficient number of people will be affected by this "real" burden.
73. Id. at 613. See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
Therefore, a regulation which has been narrowly drawn so as to provide a close tie
between the means chosen and a proper governmental end, will not be found unconstitutionally overbroad although an occasional application against protected activity might occur.
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II).
74. See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 507. See note 31 supra.
75. 101 S.Ct. at 2788 and n.9. See note 62 supra.
76. See L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 712-14 (1978). This reluctance stems from
the court's continuing refusal to recognize the actual chilling effects of overbroad laws not
facially directed at pure speech. Id. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
The Court xefused to grant respondent standing to argue the overbreadth issue. If the
majority had allowed the respondent jus tertii standing, the Court would have been forced
to balance the national security interest against the claimed first amendment rights of all
those affected. The Court would have had to define the government's interest so as to minimize infringement of protected expression. Reaching this stage, there would have been no
choice but to realize that any passport denial or revocation which is intended to deter future
expression must be considered a prior restraint of political speech. See Comment, supra note
13, at 193.
77. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4969 (1981); Goldwater v. Carter, 100
S. Ct. 533 (1979) (mem.); First Nat'l City Bank v. Vanco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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A narrow construction of the federal regulation in dispute7s could have protected the rights of future travelers. This approach would check administrative
abuses of discretion and reduce any chilling effect on protected expression.
Nevertheless, the majority stated that there was adequate protection against
abuse because the government had adopted a narrow construction of the term
national security79 which limited the application of the regulation to only those
activities directly affecting national security.8 0 It is unclear, however, whether
the government's construction would be sufficient to allay the potential chilling
impact on the free speech rights of other travellers.
As part of the protection afforded fundamental rights, the Court has required that the government employ the least restrictive means capable of serving the governmental interest.8' Therefore, if the Secretary of State could have
protected the national security without burdening the respondent's freedom of
speech, the passport should not have been invalidated. Accordingly, several less
intrusive means of protecting national security were available, including an
order enjoining respondent's publications,2 revocation of the passport after a
formal charge of committing a felony,3 or placing area restriction on certain
hostile countries.84 These alternative remedies would have satisfied the govern78. Possible narrowing constructions include the "direct and immediate consequence"
standard from New York Times. Another possibility is to limit the proscribable conduct to
those activities typically punishable by criminal statutes. See generally 629 F.2d at 110-17
(Appendix to dissenting opinion).
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2783 n.61. Answering respondent's charge that the passport revocation
was being used as punishment for unpopular criticism, the Court found the government's
use of the term "serious danger to national security" consistent with previous constructions
of that phrase. Id. (citing Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956)).
80. See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 538, 544 (1956).
81.

See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464

(1969).
82. This method has been used against other CIA agents who have violated their secrecy
agreements. See Snepp v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 763 (1980); United States v. Marchetti, 466
F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). Injunctions are preferable because the
niche which has been carved out of the first amendment by this type of prior restraint is
definite and limited. The majority, however, found this method ineffective as long as respondent resides abroad. 101 S. Ct. at 2782 n.60.
83. This alternative is based on the notion that a passport is not intended to be an
instrument to limit personal freedoms. See Comment, supra note 13. In discussing passport
removal for speech reasons it was suggested, "If the government has insufficient evidence to
indict an individual on an attempt or conspiracy count, it has no power to restrict his freedom on the basis of its suspicion. If it has sufficient evidence it should be forced to fish or
cut bait, rather than inflict the punishment of passport denial without the safeguards of
criminal procedure." Id. at 198. See also Erhlich, supra note 11, at 140; Developments, supra

note 14, at 1152.
84. Respondent announced his intention to disrupt CIA operations in 1974. Since then,
he has published two books, divulged the names of many alleged agents and has been accused of instigating acts of violence. However, it was not until one week after an article
appeared, linking respondent with Iran and the "Hostage Crisis" did the executive branch
take any action. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra. In light of the chronology, the
government's intention becomes dear. An area restriction on Iran, either in general or
applied only to the respondent, would have served the government's purpose while remaining
solidly within the constitutional limits as drawn by the Court in Zemel. See generally, Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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